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Review of The Quantum Revolution in
Philosophy by Richard Healey
What is it that’s revolutionary about quantum theory (QT)? Tradition-
ally, it has been thought that the answer consists in novel and surprising
aspects of the world it describes: superpositions, indeterminacy, non-locality,
etc. The central claim of Richard Healey’s new book is that this is mistaken.
Quantum theory is revolutionary not because it represents new
and unfamiliar physical things and processes in the universe,
but because of the way it improves our use and understanding of
representations of the universe we could offer without it. (121)
It will take some time to unpack this claim, but first a bit on the layout
and intended audience of this book. The book consists of two parts: Part I
is intended to provide a relatively self-contained presentation of the formal
elements of QT.1 After an interlude chapter summarizing problems with rival
interpretations, Part II develops Healey’s account further and draws out a
variety of philosophical lessons about scientific representation, probability,
explanation, meaning, and fundamentality, among other things. The book
is primarily intended for those without a background in QT: philosophers,
scientists and laypeople interested in going beyond the metaphors found in
popular presentations.
Healey’s presentation in Part I is distinctive in a couple of respects. First,
it introduces the mathematical formalism of QT by starting from detailed
experimental procedures, going well beyond the simplified presentation of
the two-slit and EPR experiments found in many philosophical treatments.
Second, it is careful not to assume the usual representational role ascribed
to parts of the formalism (especially, quantum states). It’s hard to know
whether these features will make the presentation more or less accessible to
1Healey uses “quantum theory” rather than “quantum mechanics” as his account is
meant to apply not only to the non-relativistic quantum mechanics of particles, but also
to quantum field theory and even proposed accounts of quantum gravity.
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those without a background in the area. I suspect that for some philosophers
the detailed presentations of experimental procedures and careful mathemat-
ical presentation will be tough going. That said, Healey has made an effort
to make the material more accessible by relegating some of the details to
appendixes at the back of the book and boxes in the text. For those with a
familiarity of QT, Part I provides a careful and novel presentation of key no-
tions. It also contains important details of the understanding of QT Healey
advocates. Of particular importance is the treatment of the Born rule in
Chapter 5, which Healey takes to apply to certain “canonical magnitude
claims” rather than the outcomes of measurements. (I will return to this
below.)
Roughly, the picture of QT introduced in Part I is as follows. The
models used in QT are not straightforward representations or descriptions
of physical reality, but rather are used to guide agents in their beliefs about
certain non-quantum physical magnitude claims. For example, one might
use QT to determine the probability of a sliver atom hitting a screen at a
certain location beyond a Stern-Gerlach apparatus. In the course of applying
QT, one will assign a quantum state to the silver atom, but this quantum
state is not a description of the physical condition of the atom. Rather,
it—when combined with the Born rule—serves as a prescription of how one
should set their credences about the location of impact on the screen.
At a first-pass, Healey’s view may draw comparisons to the Copenhagen
interpretation, QBism or simple instrumentalism, but there are important
differences. First, while it doesn’t function descriptively, the quantum state
ascribed to some system is objective for Healey. For a given agent (hypotheti-
cal or actual), there is a correct quantum state to ascribe that is independent
of the agent’s subjective beliefs. Second, there is no important role played
by measurements per se. QT tells an agent how to set her credences regard-
ing some empirically significant canonical magnitude claim—something of
the form Ms ∈ ∆, where M is a dynamical variable of the system s whose
value is in ∆. What counts as an empirically significant claim is determined
by modeling the degree of environmentally-induced decoherence associated
with the quantum state of the system. For instance, a claim about the loca-
tion of a silver atom after passing through a Stern-Gerlach apparatus (but
before hitting the detection screen) lacks empirical significance so long as its
quantum state has not decohered. Thus, QT provides no advice about such
claims. However, once the atom impacts the detection screen, its interaction
with the screen’s constituents leads to rapid decoherence, and hence, a claim
about its location on the screen counts as a significant canonical magnitude
claim.
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Part II seeks to further develop the account and reveal its implications
for a variety of philosophical topics. There are many interesting and con-
troversial claims to be found here, but perhaps most important is the role
of meaning, as this adds another dimension to Healey’s view and further
distinguishes it from simple instrumentalism. Given what’s been said so far,
the primary role for QT is to provide expert advice as to how agents should
set their credences regarding significant canonical magnitude claims. While
such magnitude claims needn’t be measurement outcomes (most instances
of decoherence occur outside of the lab), one still gets the feeling that QT
functions as a kind of magic 8-ball providing advice with no account of why
it does so. The account of meaning proposed in Chapter 12 promises to say
how QT influences our understanding of reality by altering the meaning of
various claims describing it.
Return again to a sliver atom passing through a Stern-Gerlach device.
One may make various claims about the atom and the apparatus without
any use of QT, for example: “The atom is emitted via a certain preparation
procedure”; “The atom is detected by a screen.” If one were unaware of
QT, they may draw certain inferences from these claims—e.g., “the atom
has a certain determinate value of angular momentum after passing through
the apparatus.” On the inferentialist view of meaning (Brandom (1998,
2009)) endorsed by Healey, the meaning of such claims is constituted by
their place in a web of inferences of this kind.2 When we apply QT to a given
situation, it alters the inferences we may draw from (and to) the canonical
magnitude claims involved and hence, changes their meaning. For instance,
we cannot infer that an atom has a determinate angular momentum after
passing through the Stern-Gerlach device because such claims lack empirical
significance (and indeed, such inferences could get us into trouble if further
experiments are performed on the atom). Thus, QT impacts our description
of the world, not by providing novel descriptions, but by altering the meaning
of our non-quantum descriptions. This important second role for QT is not
so easily dismissed as instrumentalism.3
To recap, Healey proposes two primary roles for QT: (1) to provide
expert advice on how situated agents (real or hypothetical) should set their
credences for significant canonical magnitude claims and (2) to affect the
meaning of such claims by altering the web of inferences in which they
occur.
2These inferences are intended to be “material” inferences (Sellars (1953)), which
needn’t be deductively valid.
3It does bear a similarity to Bohr’s views, e.g., that “[p]hysics concerns what we can
say about nature” (see 253).
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Some will be unhappy with the understanding of QT offered in this
book. Those who look to physics for a God’s-eye description of reality will
be dissatisfied with Healey’s more modest claim that:
by applying quantum theory we are able more effectively and
responsibly to entertain significant claims about the world and
to form reasonable expectations as to which are true. (237)
In this way, QT only has an indirect influence on our understanding of
the world. This prompts the question, where should we turn for a direct
representation of reality?
This question faces any interpretation that rejects the assumption that
quantum models represent (correspond to) aspects of reality. Some QBists
seem to have retreated to the phenomenal realm and claimed that QT tells
us only about what future experiences one should expect. The Copenhagen
interpretation attempted to draw a bold line between the classical world
of measurement apparatuses and the ineffable quantum reality we measure
with these instruments. Healey wisely avoids the appeal to “classical” de-
scription, noting that we sometimes apply QT to systems such as the Higgs
field, or a K0 meson with its quark constituents (130). Instead, he proposes
that QT requires certain ontological assumptions that he calls—in contrast
to Bell’s term “beables”—assumables (127). Thus, QT doesn’t have any
ontology of its own (beables), but rather borrows ontology from elsewhere
(assumables) in its application. But what is the source and status of assum-
ables?
This question points to a certain tension in Healey’s view. On the one
hand, QT is supposed to be a revelation, revealing “what philosophers should
have known anyway” (203). On the other hand, QT is revolutionary in that
its models serve their function without directly representing anything phys-
ical. The former idea would seem to motivate adopting a thoroughgoing
pragmatism about science; one which disavows altogether scientific practices
aimed at the faithful representation of a mind-independent reality. But the
latter idea suggests that QT is unique in lacking beables of its own; presum-
ably, other physical theories do directly represent the world. This hybrid
picture seems to be suggested by the non-quantum canonical magnitude
claims that QT tells us about. Both ideas face challenges: the hybrid ap-
proach requires saying why it is that QT is unique among physical theories in
deploying non-representational models. The full pragmatist approach faces
familiar worries about relativism, but also threatens to undermine much of
the novelty of Healey’s account of QT. If all scientific theories are to be
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understood solely as useful guides for situated agents, then what sense can
be made of the claim that quantum states do not function descriptively?
They would seem to have the same status as states in classical physics; both
feature in our best guides for navigating the world.
Another question concerns the kinds of explanations available on Healey’s
view. Realists often object that non-descriptive understandings of QT un-
dermine that theory’s ability to explain important physical phenomena.4
Healey claims that his view allows for explanation by: (1) rendering the ex-
planandum expected and (2) telling us what it depends on. For instance, in
an EPR experiment, we can say that violations of Bell inequalities found
when Alice and Bob compare their data are to be expected given the prepa-
ration procedure and the resultant Born probabilities. We can also say that
the correlations in measurement outcomes counterfactually depend on the
common preparation procedure. But, there seems to be something missing
from Healey’s proposed explanation. As he notes:
the theory has no resources to describe any causes mediating
between [the preparation] and the recording events. (183)
For the traditional realist, there is a story to be told about the evolution of
the system—corresponding to the evolution of its quantum state—but, for
Healey, such a story is unavailable.
On Healey’s view, quantum models act as “informational bridges” be-
tween non-quantum magnitude claims without describing underlying phys-
ical processes involving the systems to which they are applied (207, Healey
(2017)). But some bridges are better than others, and we’d like an explana-
tion for why this is so. Bridges that stand have features that bridges that
fall down lack: they are based in true principles of engineering. Similarly,
that our quantum models provide effective bridges stands in need of expla-
nation if they are non-representational. One particularly striking case is
environmental decoherence which, as an evolution of quantum states, does
not correspond to any physical process on Healey’s view. But why should we
care about whether decoherence occurs in a model? The answer that doing
so is simply required by accepting QT strikes me as unsatisfying (131). Nor-
mative prescriptions are only as good as their motivation, and descriptive
explanations are an important source of such motivation.
In sum, while I have some reservations about Healey’s pragmatist ac-
count, The Quantum Revolution marks a major advance. The vast majority
4See, for instance, the criticisms of QBism in Timpson (2008); Wallace (2017); Brown
(2017).
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of quantum interpreters have simply assumed that QT provides a novel de-
scription of reality. Those that have recognized other options typically have
in mind subjectivist views like QBism, but Healey’s view provides an im-
portant third option: QT provides objectively correct guidance about the
world. Healey’s view suggests a radical revision to the standard problems
and the philosophical import of QT, and such a shake up is certainly good
for progress in the area.
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